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Introduction  
Climate change mitigation poses significant challenges for South Africa and its energy 
development. Not only does South Africa have an extremely energy-intensive economy based 
primarily on coal leading to relatively high emissions, but it simultaneously faces a host of 
daunting development challenges, exacerbated by the legacy of apartheid. Challenges for 
development include a dramatic gap between rich and poor, a heritage of racial oppression and 
inequality, a lack of infrastructure, high levels of unemployment and urbanisation, an economy 
adjusting to globalisation, and the new challenge of AIDS. Given the challenges of development 
to meet basic needs, mitigation policies and measures have to be integrated with development 
goals. While South Africa’s traditional development path, based on energy- and capital-
intensive mega-projects is unfavourable for mitigation strategies, it may be possible to 
incorporate sustainable development goals with mitigation. 
This paper presents a case study of human development and climate change in South Africa. It 
starts by outlining the key development challenges that the country faces and the history of 
recent responses in development policy. Section 2 hones in on the energy sector, providing a 
brief profile of the sector contributing most to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The 
implications of South Africa’s ‘minerals-energy complex’1 for its GHG emissions profile are 
examined in section 3. Section 4 discusses the context and development of South African 
climate change policy, and examines implementation progress to date. The final section of the 
paper begins with a summary analysis of key mitigation options in energy efficiency, changes in 
the fuel mix and structural changes. Section 5 then examines the key constraints facing the 
implementation of such options, before concluding with possibilities for international co-
operation to contribute to sustainable development and mitigation in South Africa.  
1. Overview of South African development challenges  
1.1 The legacy of apartheid  
South Africa has an estimated population of 47.4 million people (July 2006)2, of which 57.5% 
live in urban areas. Economic activity (and the urban population) is concentrated around four 
large urban clusters: in the Western Cape (Cape Town), the Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth, East 
London), Kwa-Zulu Natal (Durban), and Gauteng (Johannesburg, Pretoria and others), with the 
largest proportion of the economy located in Gauteng, the historical centre of the mining 
industry.  
The economy was historically based on mineral extraction and processing and agriculture, 
particularly gold mining. However, from the 1950s agriculture declined in significance, and 
mining activities expanded dramatically, initially dominated by gold, but followed by other 
minerals, notably coal and platinum. From the 1950s industrialization led to the development of 
a significant manufacturing sector, which began to rival the importance of mining in its 
contribution to GDP, followed by the rise of a services sector in the 1970s. The development 
path pursued by the apartheid state from the 1940s to the 1990s was based on the development 
of mining and heavy industry, and characterized by extremely low energy prices and massive 
capital-intensive and energy-intensive projects. Changes in sectoral contribution to the economy 
over time can be seen in Figure 1 below. Two notable features are the decline in the contribution 
                                                     
1  In one of the most insightful analyses of the development of the South African economy, Fine and Rustomjee 
propose a ‘minerals-energy complex’, consisting of a tight set of economic interrelationships between the 
mining, energy and minerals processing sectors. Their central thesis argues that the complex dominates the 
South African economy despite the relative decline of the mining sector, and has had (and will have) a profound 
effect on past and future growth patterns (Fine & Rustomjee 1996). 
2  Population estimate from (SSA 2006); the estimate for urbanization is based on the 2001 Census, since no more 
recent estimates are available. The next census will be conducted in 2011. The definition of ‘urban’ changed 
between 1996 and 2001. The figure above for 1996 was rebased using the new definition (SSA 2003). 
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to mining to GDP, and the relatively stable contribution to the economy over the period of the 
energy-intensive sectors of the economy (mining, transport and industry) – unlike other 
economies, these sectors were not eclipsed by the services sector as the economy developed, 
and although industry’ contribution to GDP declined from 1980 to 1990, this decline halted at 
the beginning of the 1990s. Both the country’s imports and exports are dominated by the 
minerals production and processing and energy sectors – the country’s most significant exports 
are gold, platinum and coal, and the most significant import is crude oil. 
Figure 1: Sectoral contribution to economy, 1946-2005 
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Although South Africa is a middle-income developing country, its economic and social 
development was highly uneven due to apartheid, finally abolished in 1994. This left a legacy of 
extreme inequality, leading commentators to speak of ‘two economies’, or ‘two worlds’. In the 
most recent Human Development Report (2006), South Africa’s Gini coefficient ranked the 
country 116th most economically unequal out of 126 countries for which data was available. 
Likewise, South Africa’s ranking according to the Human Development Index is 121 (most 
developed=1), whereas in GDP per capita (PPP) terms, South Africa is ranked 52nd (UNDP 
2006), indicating the significant disparity between economic wealth and development in South 
Africa (UNDP 2006). While the affluent sectors of South African society have access to 
infrastructure (including power, water and sanitation) and economic and social facilities 
comparable to most developed countries, poor communities suffer from lack of basic 
infrastructure, social and economic marginalization, unemployment, and high levels of violence, 
and bear the main burden of diseases such as AIDS and tuberculosis. The post-apartheid 
government’s attempts to address these were complicated by a number of factors. By the end of 
apartheid, the economy was in crisis, and economic growth had dropped to low levels, partly as 
an outcome of structural economic problems due to apartheid, and partly due to sanctions and 
other forms of international pressure brought to bear on the country during the 1980s. In 
addition to these problems, globalization posed further challenges, since much of the South 
African economy was not internationally competitive.  
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1.2 Development policy frameworks 
The post-1994 government’s broad policy framework has been based on two sets of principles: 
first, resolving the macro-economic problems existing at the end of the apartheid era, and 
second, providing services and employment for the majority of the population. Contrary to 
popular expectations, the macro-economic policy framework has been quite conservative, with a 
strong emphasis on macro-economic stability. Central aims have been to resolve the financial 
crisis which the apartheid state found itself in at the beginning of the 1990s, and to promote a 
developmental agenda aimed at accelerating economic growth and meeting basic needs. One of 
the key areas to be addressed has been the apartheid-linked infrastructure backlog. These 
development aims are encapsulated in three successive policy frameworks: the 1994 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the 1996 Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy (GEAR,), and the most recent 2006 Accelerated and Shared Growth 
Initiative AsgiSA (see (ANC 1994); (DTI 1996); (AsgiSA 2006).  
Published in the year of transition, the RDP was primarily aimed at overcoming the economic 
and social marginalisation of the majority of the South African population under apartheid and 
outlined a programme of job creation through public works, and meeting a range of basic needs, 
as key priorities. Quantified goals were set for delivery of several basic services. For instance, 
the RDP proposed to address the housing backlog of some 2-3 million houses by aiming to 
build 300 000 units each year for the first five years. In the same period, 30% of the land was to 
be redistributed. In providing basic services of water and sanitation, a short-term target of 25 
litres of water per person per day was identified. In the energy sector, the main aim of the RDP 
was ‘electricity for all’. The RDP target of connecting 2.4 million unelectrified households to 
the grid between 1994 and 1999 (an average of over 400 000 households per year) is one of the 
few that was exceeded (Borchers et al. 2001). Since 2000, electrification has continued under 
the National Electrification Programme at a slower pace (around 250 000 households per 
year),with the aim of achieving universal access to electricity by 2012; the RDP target-based 
approach has been replaced by a broader approach aimed at ensuring the technical, economic 
and social sustainability of the programme (Tinto 2003). 
Two years later, the focus of GEAR shifted to macro-economic stability and economic growth, 
and was based on a policy of opening the economy and encouraging investment. It was thought 
at the time that many RDP goals could be met through macro-economic reforms. While 
relatively successful in addressing macro-economic problems, the policies did not create 
employment or address poverty at the required rate, and the government acknowledged that the 
role of the market in addressing problems such as unemployment was more limited than was 
assumed. By the end of the 1990s, the government saw the state playing a much more 
significant role in development. Plans to privatise parastatals were shelved, and these came to be 
seen as vehicles for infrastructure development and service delivery. 
In 2006, the government announced a new development policy framework, AsgiSA, which, 
responding to the failures of earlier policies in these areas by proposing a ‘national shared 
growth initiative’, to counter the exclusion from the formal economy of the bottom third of the 
population. The initiative was proposed in response to a set of problems not addressed by the 
earlier frameworks, including 
• a strong currency, which undermined the competitiveness of non-commodity sections of 
the economy,  
• backlogs in national infrastructure, which undermined both basic service delivery and 
high-end economic growth, and  
• a shortage of skills, lack of support for small businesses, and economic concentration in 
the economy, leading to barriers to entry into various markets in the economy, and the 
exclusion of a significant proportion of the population from the formal economy. 
In response to these constraints, AsgiSA proposed a large-scale state-led infrastructure 
development programme, specific sectoral development plans (including business process 
outsourcing, tourism, biofuels and agro-processing), national skills development, an overhaul of 
regulation and policy-making, and measures to eliminate the ‘second economy’ (i.e. create 
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opportunities to participate in the formal economy for those excluded from it). Growing and 
diversifying the economy, alleviating poverty, and lowering unemployment remain key 
development goals. Clearly the state seeks to diversify the economy away from the apartheid-
era development path, based on the energy-intensive ‘minerals-energy complex’, but these 
sectors represent one of the key areas of international competitiveness of the South African 
economy, and still form the basis for a large proportion of the economy, an even more important 
share of exports, and are currently attracting significant local and international investment. 
Reconciling sustainable development goals, such as mitigating GHGs, alleviating poverty, and 
creating employment, with the current structure of the economy, is one of the main challenges 
which South African policymakers face. Thus, in South Africa, the focus of the tension between 
development objectives and climate change mitigation objectives is the energy system, as well 
as the point at which this tension can be resolved through innovative policies and measures. We 
thus now turn to a discussion of the South African energy sector. 
2. The South African energy sector  
2.1 Profile of the South African energy system  
The basis of South Africa’s current energy system is coal, which constitutes an extremely high 
proportion of South Africa’ primarily energy consumption – in fact, the highest in the world 
(excluding non-commercial energy carriers) in 2003, followed closely by China (BP 2004). In 
2004, coal comprised around 70% of South Africa’s primary energy, crude oil around 23%, 
nuclear energy around 3% and renewable energy around 8%3 (DME 2004). As for electricity 
generation, an even greater share, 92%, came from coal-fired power stations in 2004 (NER 
2004a). 
Unlike many other countries, South Africa did not go through a transition to oil in the 1950s and 
1960s, and the limited switch to oil products which did occur in industry was reversed in the 
1970s, primarily because of the development of a massive coal-based synthetic fuels 
programme. As a result of the low cost of coal (see below), there has never been any significant 
use of liquid fuels in electricity generation.4 Almost all crude oil is imported, due to the lack of 
significant local reserves, and the country possesses no significant gas reserves, except a few 
small fields off the south coast of the Western Cape (currently used as feedstock for synthetic 
fuels), and a field of similar size off the west coast (not exploited yet). A small amount of 
natural gas is imported from Mozambique.  
South Africa possessed 5.4% of the world’s coal reserves, mines 4.9% of the world’s annual 
coal production, and uses 3.5% of annually world coal consumption, the remainder being 
exported (www.cslforum.org/safrica.htm). Other significant energy resources are very small oil 
and gas reserves, significant reserves of uranium (which is largely a by-product of gold mining), 
some wind resources around the coast, and very high quality solar insolation over most of the 
country. 
The development of the South African energy system can be divided into two related aspects. 
The development of an energy-industry complex, designed to drive South Africa’s 
industrialisation during the twentieth century, and the development of what might be termed 
‘civil energy’, or the provision of energy for households, commerce and services. The former 
was structured by the development of a ‘minerals-energy complex’, whereas the latter was 
largely influenced by, and subject to, the former, as well as to the dictates of apartheid social 
and economic policy. Energy services were largely developed for the white population during 
and before apartheid, and the rest of the population was largely excluded. 
                                                     
3  This figure represents mainly biomass used for residential heating and cooking, and has never been accurately 
determined, and is therefore probably unreliable. The contribution of ‘modern’ renewable energy to the South 
African energy economic is ver small (see below). 
4  This is about to change: the state utility Eskom is in the process of constructing two large open-cycle gas turbine 
peaking plants in the Western Cape, which will initially run off diesel. 
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The modern South African energy economy developed in a number of investment cycles. The 
initial coal and electricity nexus developed from the 1900s to World War 2, based primarily on 
the expansion of gold mining around what is now called Gauteng, as well as the (less 
significant) development of municipal power infrastructure. The post-war era saw a boom in 
energy investment: a significant expansion in electricity generating capacity, driven by massive 
expansion of gold mining and the expansion of the mining sector out of its traditional focus on 
gold and coal. This was accompanied by the development of a significant manufacturing sector, 
including the establishment of an indigenous refining industry from the mid 1950s to the mid-
1960s, by which time South Africa had no need to import liquid fuels. The development of a 
minerals processing industry from the 1960s led to significant expansion in the electricity 
system. Electricity demand quadrupled between 1950 and 1970, and quadrupled again between 
1970 and 2000, growing significantly faster than the economy until the mid-1980s. The 1970s 
was probably the most significant decade in the twentieth century for energy sector investment, 
for several reasons.  
• First, electricity demand was not slowed by the 1973 oil crisis. At the same time, the 
national grid was completed, which led to the development of a new technological 
model based on large power plants (average size around 3600MW) located on major 
coalfields.  
• Secondly, in order to provide the coal for all these plants, a massive investment in new 
coal mines was made, largely by the private sector, driven in part by an export boom 
bought about by changes in coal policy.  
• Thirdly, concerns by the apartheid state about the looming oil embargo led to the 
development of a massive strategic petroleum reserve, an inland refinery, and a massive 
synthetic fuels programme based on coal, which also increased electricity demand.  
• Fourthly, the state also invested heavily in a nuclear power and weapons programme, 
including an indigenous fuel cycle (shut down in the 1990s), which was also very 
electricity-intensive(Marquard 2006). 
By contrast, the 1980s saw a stagnation in the economy and in energy demand growth, leaving 
significant overcapacity in refining/synfuels and electricity generation, and plant in both 
industries was mothballed. Eskom’s capacity expansion programme was stretched out until the 
late 1990s, and no new capacity was added until 2006. In order to use this excess capacity, 
Eskom restructured its tariffs in the late 1980s, and a new round of investments in energy-
intensive industries followed in the 1990s. 
The South African economy is extremely energy-intensive by international standards, and only 
a handful of countries have higher intensities Energy intensity is not however equally 
distributed in the economy, but concentrated in specific sectors. Figures 1 and 2 below indicate 
energy consumption and contribution to GDP. Manufacturing and transport dominate energy 
demand and are the most energy intensive sectors. The reasons for the high energy intensity of 
the South African economy lies in the high use of coal and electricity and the large number of 
energy-intensive enterprises, which are linked to the low prices of electricity and coal, which 
have consistently been around 40% of US average prices for the last four decades (calculated 
using price data from Eskom annual reports and US EIA). While this has provided South Africa 
with a significant competitive advantage in minerals processing, it has also deterred investment 
in alternative energy supply, and more importantly, in energy efficiency; South African 
industrial energy efficiency is on average significantly lower than in other countries(Hughes et 
al. 2002). 
Figure 2: Energy demand, 1992-2000 
Source: Based on data in energy balances (DME 2002b) 
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The development of a ‘civil energy’ infrastructure was based primarily on municipal 
electrification in its first phase. Early electrification was premised on the spatial and socio-
economic characteristics of the colonial and apartheid states. Access to modern energy services 
was developed along racial lines, with fairly rapid electrification of ‘white’ households in the 
first part of the twentieth century, followed by a programme of subsidised electrification of rural 
‘white’ farms and isolated settlements from the 1940s to the 1980s by the state utility Eskom. 
Non-white urban and rural areas suffered from a virtual absence of electricity infrastructure 
development before and during apartheid, and both households and businesses were deprived of 
electricity. Households, particularly in rural areas, had to rely on unsafe and unhealthy fuels 
such as wood, paraffin and coal, which caused a range of illnesses (primarily respiratory), as 
well as a set of paraffin-related maladies (including death), including frequent fires and burns 
(caused by unsafe stoves) and paraffin poisoning caused by accidental ingestion by children. 
The obvious alternative which characterises most middle-income countries, LPG, was not 
widely distributed due collusion by oil companies and the distorted regulatory system. In 
response, the political transition in the 1990s led to a massive and very rapid electrification 
programme advanced and financed largely by Eskom (and politically driven and enthusiastically 
backed by the post-1994 government), which saw residential electrification rates grow from an 
estimated 30% in 1990 to a current estimated rate of 75%, including an innovative off-grid solar 
PV programme in isolated rural areas. The programme has not been accompanied by reforms in 
other energy markets, and although paraffin appliances have been made safer (primarily through 
new standards), fuels such as LPG are not available on the same bases as in other middle-
income developing countries, and poor households (even several years after electrification) still 
use significant amounts of fuelwood and paraffin. 
Because of the energy intensity of the economy, and the extreme income differential in South 
Africa, residential energy use is a far smaller fraction of final energy demand than in other 
countries, and demand from poor households is even smaller. The impact of providing 
electrification to most of the rest of the population since 1990 has had relatively little impact on 
electricity consumption. The result of gaining around three million new (primarily low-income) 
residential customers between 1990 and 2004 only increased Eskom’s sales by around 4% 
(Eskom 1990; NER 2002), whereas growth in Eskom’s industrial sales in the same period added 
17% to the 1990 total. 
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2.2 Key actors and institutions5 
As indicated above, the three energy supply sectors in the country are coal, liquid fuels and 
electricity. The production of coal is dominated by several large multinationals, which produce 
coal for the international and internal markets, and also under long-term contracts for electricity 
production. Synfuels are an exception – the coal resource is owned by Sasol, but mined under 
contact by an independent company. The coal market was heavily regulated until the late 1980s 
when all forms of regulation were removed, but is now only monitored by the Department of 
Minerals and Energy (DME), which plays a facilitating role in boosting coal exports. 
The liquid fuels industry consists of several crude refiners, which own three refineries along the 
coast and one inland refinery, the previously state-owned Sasol, which owns and operates a 
massive synthetic fuels plant at Secunda in Mpunalanga, and the state oil company PetroSA, 
which owns and operates a small synfuels plant fed by natural gas in Mossel Bay. Pipeline 
infrastructure is owned by the state pipeline company Petronet (part of the larger state-owned 
transport conglomerate Transnet), and the rest of the industry is vertically integrated. Refiners 
also own distribution infrastructure, and a significant share of the retail market, although 
refiners are barred from operating retail outlets themselves. The regulatory regime is complex 
and labyrinthine, dating mostly from the apartheid era. Pipeline tariffs are set by the National 
Energy Regulator, but all other aspects of the industry are regulated by the DME. Prices are set 
for each stage of the value chain, based on an import parity price, and importing of liquid fuels 
is controlled by the issuing of permits – in practice, only refining companies are granted 
permits. Wholesale prices of liquid fuels are relatively high by international standards, but taxes 
are relatively low, leading to modest prices to end-users. Gas pipelines are regulated by the 
National Energy Regulator. 
The electricity sector is dominated by the state-owned national utility Eskom, which owns and 
operates more than 90% of generation assets, the whole transmission grid, and a significant 
portion of the distribution industry, especially in rural areas. The remaining generation assets 
are owned by private producers and local authorities, who were officially discouraged from 
building additional plant from the 1960s onwards. Local authorities have a right of supply in 
their areas of jurisdiction, although for a number of historical reasons Eskom distributes 
electricity in many local authorities. Eskom is most cases also sells electricity directly to large 
industrial customers. Electricity is regulated by the National Energy Regulator of South Africa 
(NERSA), which licenses all operators and approves tariffs. 
The key government institution in the energy sector is the DME, which formulates and 
implements energy policy, and oversees a group of associated institutions, including the NER, 
the National Nuclear Regulator (which oversees nuclear safety), the Nuclear Energy 
Corporation of South Africa (which undertakes nuclear research) and the Central Energy Fund, 
which is the holding company for the national oil company PetroSA, as well as owning the 
recently-established South African National Energy Research Institute and the Energy 
Development Corporation (formed to promote renewable energy). Energy policy is also closely 
monitored, and at times influenced, by a group of industry stakeholders, including the South 
Africa Petroleum Industries Association (SAPIA) representing oil companies (including Sasol), 
the Chamber of Mines representing mining companies (including coal mines), the Energy-
Intensive Users Group whose 25 members consume 40% of the country’s electricity, and the 
Chemicals and Allied Industries Association representing chemicals industries. Other 
stakeholders include NGOs (particularly environmental NGOs), unions, and the South African 
Local Government Association (SALGA). Historically, the energy supply industry (specifically 
mining companies, Eskom and the oil companies) have been very closely involved in making 
energy policy in South Africa. After 1994, the process broadened somewhat to include a wider 
range of stakeholders, but lack of state capacity in energy policymaking has meant that industry 
continues to play a significant role. 
                                                     
5 Material for this section has been sourced from (Marquard 2006). 
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3. Greenhouse gas emissions overview  
The most comprehensive survey to date of South African greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions was 
the inventory for 1990 and 1994 compiled as part of South Africa’s Initial National 
Communication (INC) to the UNFCCC (RSA 2004). Most of the data below, except where 
noted, is extracted from the inventory contained in the INC. An updated inventory is currently 
being planned by the Department of Environment and Tourism (DEAT). South Africa has 
relatively high emissions per capita, given its level of human and economic development: at 7.8 
tons CO2 annually (including non-energy emissions). This is the 37th-highest CO2 emissions per 
capita, higher than many OECD countries such as Italy, France, Sweden and Portugal. 
However, South Africa’s level of economic and social development lag far behind its carbon 
emissions: as outlined above, its per capita GDP is only the 52nd-highest, and the country only 
ranks 121st in the UNDP’s Human Development Index. This relatively high level of GHG 
emissions by comparison to the country’s level of socio-economic development is largely due to 
the high energy intensity of the economy (see above), but it does render the problem of 
reconciling development goals and GHG mitigation more difficult. The Inventory for 1994 was 
compiled, according to IPCC guidelines (IPCC 1996), for the three major GHGs: CO2, CH4, and 
N20 (RSA 2004b, p14). There are some significant characteristics of South African GHG 
emissions:  
a) CO2 is the most significant GHG, comprising over 80% of GHG emissions.  
b) Energy-related activities are the dominant cause of GHG emissions, totalling more than 
78%, and  
c) the energy supply industry (electricity, refineries/synfuel plants) around 56% of these (RSA 
2002b: 15-16). 
Most of the CO2 is generated by the energy sector (around 91% in 1994).6 The pie chart below 
portrays energy and non-energy emissions for the three gases (CO2-equivalents). 
Figure 3: South Africa’s inventory for three greenhouse gases by sector, 1994 
Source: (RSA 2004) 
                                                     
6  The share of carbon dioxide from the energy sector is higher at 91% than for the three GHGs shown in Figure 3, 
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3.1 Energy emissions  
The energy sector is the key source of South Africa’s emissions (see Figure 3), which include a 
number of critical energy-related activities including energy industries (45% of total gross 
emissions), energy used in manufacturing industries (14%), energy used in transport (11%), 
fugitive emissions from fuels (2%), and other energy-related activities (6.6%), which include 
commercial (0.2%), residential (2.0%) and agricultural (4.4%) use of energy (calculated from 
RSA 2004). The heavy reliance of the South African energy system on coal, the high level of 
electricity use, and the energy-intensive synthetic fuels programme are the main drivers of GHG 
emissions in the energy sector. 
There is some question regarding the emissions from the synthetic fuels process. While annual 
CO2 emissions were reported at 10.7 Mt (Van der Merwe & Scholes 1998) in the initial 
Inventory, Sasol’s own data indicate that these are more likely to be around 50 Mt per annum. A 
figure in this vicinity was reported by a number of analysts for years from 2002 to 2004, (Lloyd 
2005; Mako & Samuel 1984), and verified with Sasol. Future trends in GHG emissions, 
according to current government energy plans, indicate a rise from just over 300 Mt CO2 in 
2001 to around 600 Mt in 2025, given an expansion in the energy system based on similar 
energy resources. 
3.2 Non-energy emissions  
Non-energy emissions, totalling 21.7% of total CO2-equivalent emissions, originate from 
agriculture (43%), industrial processes (37%), and waste (20%). Non-energy agricultural 
emissions consist mainly of CH4 emissions from livestock, which in South Africa are mainly 
kept in open range conditions with relatively low-quality diets, resulting in higher methane 
emissions (RSA 2004b: 19), and N2O emissions from agricultural soils due to the use of manure 
and synthetic fertiliser (RSA 2004b: 21). Industrial processes, which mainly emitted CO2, 
comprised cement (14% of non-energy CO2 emissions), lime (5%), ammonia (7%), calcium 
carbide (<1%), iron and steel (64%), ferroalloys (9%) and aluminium (1%) production and soda 
ash use (<1%). Most emissions from waste consisted of CH4 emissions from landfill sites and 
wastewater treatment facilities (RSA 2004b: 20). 
4. South African energy and climate change policy 
and actions  
4.1 The context of climate change policy in South Africa  
The climate change policy domain is complex. While the focal point for climate change in 
South Africa is the DEAT, energy policy is the line function of the DME. Energy, as we have 
seen, is the main sector contributing to GHG emissions. A number of other departments are 
centrally involved in determining areas of policy (such as industrial policy) which will influence 
mitigation policies. We briefly outline the form which decision-making takes in the South 
African government, before discussing the broad policy context, and outlining climate and 
energy policy in more detail. 
Governmental institutions in South Africa have undergone significant transformation since 
1994. The current Constitution is based on an extensive Bill of Rights, including socio-
economic rights (subject to a complicated process of interpretation by the courts) and three 
elected tiers of government (national, provincial and local). New provinces were created in 
1994. Whereas there had previously been four provinces and many ‘independent’ or ‘self-
governing’ ‘homelands’, nine provinces were now delineated and corresponding administrations 
established. Local government, previously organised along racial lines, was consolidated in an 
interim arrangement until 2000 when new authority boundaries were established. The two 
significant components of the national government are the executive, organised around the 
office of the president, and the civil service, consisting of government departments and 
associated institutions. Increasingly in the post-1994 government, the Presidency has played a 
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dominant role in co-ordinating key policy development across departments through Cabinet 
‘clusters’ (Cabinet subcommittees focused on specific areas of government), which are matched 
by similar clusters comprising senior civil servants of corresponding departments. Government 
departments, on the other hand, have maintained the same institutional structure inherited from 
the apartheid era, based loosely on the post-war UK civil service. However, they have 
undergone far-ranging changes in leadership, both for political reasons, and under post-
apartheid affirmative action programmes (RSA 2001; Marquard 2006). 
The climate change policy domain is structured around DEAT, which depends on two other 
departments for the development of specific mitigation policies. First, international negotiations 
(see below) are conducted in partnership with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in the 
context of South African foreign policy, the relevant principles of which are a focus on Africa, 
South-South co-operation (specifically Brazil-India-South African co-operation and more 
broadly through the G77&China), and a commitment to rule-based multilateralism. Second, 
energy policy is the domain of the DME.  
Policy responses to climate change have been structured by South Africa’s international 
commitments to the UNFCCC, as well as by participation by key stakeholders in the NCCC, 
including Eskom, which has played a key role, and NGOs. Business associations representing 
businesses in the energy-intensive industries have also been closely involved in policy 
processes, including the Chemical and Allied Industries Association, the Energy-Intensive 
Users Group, and the Chamber of Mines.  
Sustainable development policy is currently the subject of a consultation process. DEAT 
released a Draft Strategy for Sustainable Development at the end of 2006 for public comment. 
Coordination of this policy domain was allocated to the ‘International Relations, Peace and 
Security’ cabinet cluster in 2004, but this seems to have been mostly outward-focused (in 
relation to NEPAD) (IISD 2004). For instance, the recent decision announced by the Minister of 
Public Enterprise to proceed with the construction of a new nuclear power plant by Eskom was 
made outside the framework of the DME’s first Integrated Energy Plan (DME 2003) (in which 
further nuclear power was not a viable option in the short term), and before the second 
Integrated Energy Plan was completed. 
4.2 Links to energy and industrial policy  
The government’s 2004 National Climate Change Response Strategy prefaces its detailed list of 
measures with the proviso that ‘..it should be noted that, although DEAT may support the 
suggested measures in principle, much of the work comes under the jurisdiction of other 
national government departments, and within other spheres of government..’ (DEAT 2004, 
p.22). This is possibly most true with respect to energy policy. Most mitigation options rest on 
the success of two energy policy initiatives. While the DME is the official custodian of energy 
policy in the country, in many instances the policymaking activities of other departments and 
spheres of government have a determinate effect. Three of these are particularly important: the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the National Treasury (NT), and the Department of 
Public Enterprises (DPE) have a significant impact on the formulation and implementation of 
energy policies. These three departments play a key, policy-determining role in the ‘Economic 
cluster’.  
While the DPE’s infrastructure development programme (which includes ports, railways, power 
plants, transmission and distribution strengthening, and telecommunications) is premised on 
considerable expansion of the industrial base, the development of industrial policy itself 
provides a crucial context for energy policy and mitigation. Since industrial policy has been 
historically premised on energy-intensive industries, and the demand for electricity in particular, 
as well as bulk transport, is largely predicated on the number and size of energy-intensive 
industries in the economy. This context has framed the potential range of mitigation measures 
considered by policymakers. 
The core goals of industrial policy since 1994 have been to meet key development goals by 
accelerating economic growth, largely through diversifying the economy (in structure, 
ownership and participation), and mitigating the impact of ‘the apartheid government’s support 
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for large-scale capital-intensive industries, which, together with protection, led to poor 
productivity and competitiveness’ (Roberts 2005, p.3). The apartheid government focused a co-
ordinated effort on developing capital-intensive, usually resource-based and often strategic 
sectors such as mining, liquid fuels, beneficiation, defence and a cluster of related secondary 
industries, through a combination of protectionism, market regulation and direct state support 
and investment. The post-1994 government has promoted trade liberalisation (removal of tariff 
barriers), skills development, technological development, the development of small business, 
and more recently the provision of a range of incentives through financing by the state-owned 
Industrial Development Corporation7 (IDC), and an Integrated Manufacturing Strategy (Roberts 
2005). While the aim of the broad industrial and economy policy frameworks have been to 
diversify from the minerals-energy complex, the combined effect of non-targeted industrial 
policies, opening the economy, and the effectiveness of state agencies associated with the 
minerals processing sector in promoting new programmes has favoured the further expansion of 
the energy-intensive parts of the economy. 
While the small business programmes have been relatively successful, however, the incentive 
programmes, coupled with the efforts of other state agencies connected to the minerals, energy 
and heavy industry sectors such as the IDC, Mintek8 (which has promoted beneficiation), as 
well as the new openness of the economy, have promoted very significant developments in 
traditional energy-intensive, resource-based industries, who were best able to thrive in the 
globalised economy of the 1990s. State incentives have mainly been taken up by these 
industries. For instance, Sasol, the most energy-intensive liquid fuels producer in the world, 
alone accounted for four projects under the Strategic Industrial Projects incentive, which 
amounted to 24% of the available tax allowances (Roberts 2005). While other more 
employment-intensive industries such as textiles contracted as a result of the lowing of tariff 
barriers, energy-intensive industries were able to compete globally on account of low South 
African energy prices.  
This trend was reinforced by IDC lending, which was largely allocated to the same kinds of 
projects, and by industrial development incentives such as the Coega port development in the 
Eastern Cape, which has managed to attract a number of energy-intensive projects, including a 
new aluminium smelter, subject to a long-term power supply agreement with Eskom. Trade 
liberalisation and economic openness also led to the ‘internationalisation’ of the South African 
minerals and beneficiation sector, which was inward-looking during apartheid. Large 
conglomerates such as Anglo American have diversified globally, and South African mineral 
assets (and processing) have been incorporated into multinational resource companies such as 
BHP-Billiton.  
The current cycle of state-driven infrastructure development, specifically in electricity and 
transport infrastructure, is based on an expectation of more resource- and energy-intensive 
investments, which are further encouraged by two further factors. First, the DTI recently 
introduced a ‘Developmental Electricity Pricing Programme’, under which below-price 
electricity tariffs are negotiated with potential international investors in new energy-intensive 
projects. The aim of the incentive is to encourage investors who ‘would in the absence of DEPP 
not invest in the Republic’, by guaranteeing them (through lower electricity prices) ‘an IRR that 
will ensure that the applicant will invest in South Africa’ (DTI 2005). Second, the state is 
encouraging the development of beneficiation industries under its new mining policies, to add 
value to South African-produced raw materials, and is currently exploring ways to link 
beneficiation to mining licenses. 
                                                     
7 The Industrial Development Corporation is a state-owned enterprise which invests in key areas of the economy 
which that state regards as key development areas, later withdrawing when the enterprises concerned (or the 
sector as a whole) are regarded as competitive. Investments in the past have been mainly concentrated in the 
minerals processing and energy sectors, a trend which continues through the IDC’s heavy investment in 
Eskom’s nuclear reactor development programme. 
8 Mintek is a state institution associated with the Department of Minerals and Energy which researches and 
disseminates minerals processing technology. 
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4.3 The development of climate change policy  
South Africa signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
in 1993, and ratified it as a non-Annex 1 country in 1997, acceding to the Kyoto Protocol in 
2002. Climate change-related policymaking began in earnest in the mid-1990s with the 
establishment of the Government Committee on Climate Change (GCCC), an interdepartmental 
committee consisting of representatives from key government departments (Agriculture; 
Science and Technology; Foreign Affairs, Health, Housing, Local and Provincial Government, 
Minerals and Energy, Trade and Industry; Transport), and a stakeholder group, the National 
Committee on Climate Change (NCCC), including the above government departments, some 
provincial and local government representatives, civil society organisations, labour and 
business, and major emitters of GHGs (particularly Eskom and Sasol). The NCCC was given a 
mandate by government to both ‘express the concerns of key stakeholders’ and ‘to design and 
participate in a process leading to the formulation of a national climate change policy’ 
(www.environment.gov.za). 
In the late 1990s, the NCCC commissioned a Country Study as a basis for an Initial National 
Communication, which included a GHG emissions inventory and a range of studies on 
vulnerability, mitigation and adaptation. The Initial National Communication was submitted to 
the UNFCCC at COP 9 in 2003. The INC served as a basis for the key statement of South 
African climate change policy – the 2004 National Climate Change Response Strategy for South 
Africa, which outlined a framework for action. The main principle of the strategy was based on 
attempting a harmonisation between development challenges and climate change by integrating 
both into a sustainable development programme: 
The South African Government’s national priorities include, inter alia, the creation of 
employment, the alleviation of poverty and the provision of housing, which implies a 
commitment to the process of sustainable development and advancement. Thus South 
Africa’s position is to view climate change response as an opportunity for achieving these 
aims. (DEAT 2004, p.8) 
The Strategy cites twelve ‘key interventions’, a mix of process-oriented measures (accessing 
funds, promoting education, training and awareness, maintaining presence at UNFCCC and 
related meetings, and setting a ‘timeframe for action’ for implementation of specific policies 
and measures), adaptation and mitigation policies and measures (DEAT 2004, p.vii). The 
former were aimed at the areas of South African society which were assessed by the Country 
Study to be most vulnerable, which were climate change-related threats to health, negative 
impacts on maize production, threats to plant and animal biodiversity, diminishing water 
resources and negative impacts on rangelands, and the latter was mainly based on 
implementation of the Government’s 2003 White Paper on Renewable Energy and 2005 Energy 
Efficiency Strategy, as well as the protracted establishment of a CDM Designated National 
Authority in the DME. Seven of the 12 ‘key actions’ are entirely dependent on other 
government departments and agencies for implementation (DME, DST, DTI, DWAF, DA, IDC, 
etc), which would require these departments to develop a specific capacity, estimated to cost 
around R5 million (DEAT 2004, p.6), which emphasises the critical role of co-ordination within 
the government, and particularly co-ordination with the Treasury, as a central requirement for 
implementation. 
Climate change is, however, becoming a major concern for the executive – in 2005, a large-
scale National Climate Change Conference was held, attended by 600 delegates from 
government, business, academic institutions and civil society, including a wide range of cabinet 
ministers and the Deputy President, which augmented existing policy by resolving to increase 
cross-government co-ordination on the issue, use the 2004 Air Quality Act to regulate GHG 
emissions, establish a South African National Energy Research Institute, develop a technology 
needs assessment, establish a National Energy Efficiency Agency, compile sectoral plans to 
augment the National Climate Change Response Strategy, and inaugurate a scenario-building 
process to examine how best South Africa can meet GHG reduction targets and development 
goals at the same time (DEAT 2005). In 2006, DEAT initiated a Long-Term Mitigation 
Scenario project, in which various scenarios are being developed using energy and 
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macroeconomic models to explore the consequences of various policy interventions aimed at 
reducing GHG emissions. The scenario process aims to inform a long-term climate policy. 
4.4 Energy policies for sustainable development and their 
implication for mitigating climate change  
Developments in the energy sector have the biggest influence on GHG emissions in South 
Africa. The key policy framework for the energy sector is contained in the 1998 White Paper on 
Energy, and the subsequent 2003 White Paper on Renewable Energy and 2005 Energy 
Efficiency Strategy, which have been made key pillars of South Africa’s climate change 
mitigation strategy. The 1998 White Paper focused on improving energy governance, the 
furthering of programmes to provide affordable energy to the poor, improving energy sector 
governance (including the introduction of integrated energy planning), addressing the 
environmental impacts of energy production and use, reform of energy markets, and emphasis 
on a demand-side approach to energy policymaking (DME 1998). However, the framework was 
weak on the details of specific measures. Lack of capacity in the DME, combined with changing 
priorities of the new government, have led to uneven implementation of the policy framework 
(Marquard 2006).  
While the 1998 White Paper advocated a highly integrated, demand-side approach to energy 
policy making and implementation, emphasising transparency and public participation by 
contrast to the apartheid-era’s legacy of secrecy and almost exclusive emphasis on the supply 
side, a number of factors have led to a narrowing of energy policy objectives between 1998 and 
the present. Priorities have focused more on post-1994 national development goals, including 
service delivery to poor households (primarily through the electrification programme), 
development of national infrastructure, security of supply, formalisation of regulatory regimes 
in supply sectors (rather than deregulation), and black economic empowerment. 
The major demand-side initiative in the DME consists of the development of an Energy 
Efficiency Strategy in 2005, which set a target for national improvement in energy efficiency of 
12% by 2015 (DME 2005). The target was based on reducing final energy demand against a 
baseline figure derived from a energy model constructed for the DME’s 2003 Integrated Energy 
Plan. The target will be implemented according to a series of sectoral strategies. In the wake of 
the launch of the Strategy, a voluntary Energy Efficiency Accord was signed by the Minister of 
Minerals and Energy and 31 (later 37) businesses (primarily energy intensive industries and 
energy supply industries, but also a bank, a retail chain and the cement industry association), 
whereby the businesses committed to meeting the targets set out in the Strategy, with a higher 
target of 15% adopted by mining and industrial signatories. Accord signatories have established 
a Technical Committee to develop a detailed programme (NBI & DME 2005). The state has 
also established an Energy Efficiency Agency under the auspices of the Central Energy Fund, 
the state-owned company overseen by the DME which holds the state’s energy sector assets. 
Another focus of the DME’s activity (and the best-resourced) is the electrification programme. 
The programme has been highly successful, and aims to electrify all households in South Africa 
by 2012. The programme is, however, not well integrated with policy initiatives for other 
household fuels, which are mainly handled by a different section of the department, and 
required reforms in the LPG industry have not taken place. The electrification programme 
includes a small off-grid programme based on PV technology. In order to encourage the use of 
electricity (in place of more dangerous and unhealthy fuels such as paraffin), the government 
has introduced Free Basic Electricity, whereby qualifying households receive 50kWh free per 
month; the programme has been successful in increasing very low consumption levels of poor 
households, and partially successful in displacing other energy carriers in households.. 
On the supply side, coal policy remains unchanged from its last significant reform in the late 
1980s. The state actively promotes coal export and beneficiation, and the domestic coal market 
is not regulated. Most domestic coal is sold through long-term contracts to large users (of 
Eskom is the largest). 
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Ambitious plans for reform in the electricity sector include supply-side reform (breaking up 
Eskom into competing generation companies and a state-owned transmission company, 
introducing a market in generation), and restructuring the country’s distribution assets into six 
Regional Electricity Distributors. Both supply and distribution reform have stalled, for a number 
of reasons. Supply industry restructuring lacked natural supporters and was opposed by Eskom 
and powerful national ministries, and was finally cancelled in 2004. The distribution industry 
restructuring has stalled under pressure from local authorities and the National Treasury, 
concerned about local authorities losing their ability to tax electricity.  
However, an important post-apartheid development was the establishment of a national 
electricity regulator (in 1994), now merged with the Gas Regulator and the Petroleum Pipelines 
Regulator into a single National Energy Regulator. The plans for deregulation of the liquid fuels 
sector in South Africa were initially made contingent on the achievement of black economic 
empowerment targets, but these have largely been achieved, and there are no plans to deregulate 
the industry soon. The nuclear sector, contrary to its fortunes in the 1990s, when the new 
government regarded the whole nuclear programme as a legacy of apartheid, has undergone a 
renaissance. Eskom is developing an indigenous Pebble-Bed Modular Reactor (completion of 
prototype due in 2013) and also recently announced plans to build another nuclear plant in the 
interim, probably a similar plant to the two existing reactors at Koeberg in the Cape (French 
PWRs). Thus, energy supply sectors in South Africa are highly regulated, and renewable energy 
promotion policies and initiatives need to propose mechanisms to operate within these 
constraints. As a result, most of the current large-scale proposals are either directly promoted by 
the state or by an incumbent public or private enterprise. 
The development of renewable energy (currently negligible) was the focus of a White Paper in 
2003, the goals of which are modest: 10 000GWh of final energy demand to be produced from 
renewable sources by 2010, which is an average of around 1000GWh per year, which is 0.15% 
of total final energy demand in 2002. In order to achieve this modest aim, a number of 
‘strategic, goals, objectives and deliverables’ was set out, which included financial and fiscal 
instruments, legal instruments, technology development, and ‘awareness raising, capacity-
building and education’ (DME 1998, p.49-52). So far three concrete actions have been taken: 1) 
the establishment of a DNA in the DME; 2) the establishment of a modest capital subsidy 
programme for renewable energy projects (tens of millions of rands annually) in the DME; and 
3) the establishment in the Central Energy Fund of the Energy Development Corporation in 
2004, which invests in renewable energy projects. 
4.5 Implementation of policy to date 
While a policy framework has been developed, there has been relatively little implementation of 
two key mitigation strategies: the energy efficiency and renewables programmes. A recent 
development is the government’s biomass initiative, although it is not yet clear how this will be 
implemented, or when. The National Treasury has lowered fuel taxes on biofuels to incentivise 
their manufacture in the country, and there are a number of very small-scale biofuels projects 
recycling used cooking oil into biodiesel. The most significant renewable energy project 
currently underway is the Darling Wind Farm, a 5MW facility on the West Coast, which is 
expected to be operational in June 2007. The project recently signed a power purchase 
agreement with the City of Cape Town. There are no other large-scale renewable energy 
initiatives under consideration for execution in the medium term, with two exceptions.  
The first is a by-law proposed by the City of Cape Town, which should be enacted this year, to 
make solar water heaters compulsory on new residential properties over a certain value (to 
exclude poor households, which will continue to use electricity or other fuels for water heating).  
The second is the DME’s off-grid concession programme, under which private concessionaires 
install solar PV systems on households in isolated rural areas remote from the grid. The 
motivation for this programme is not climate change mitigation, however, and its impact on 
emissions is limited. Energy efficiency measures are largely being investigated through the 
voluntary National Energy Efficiency Accord between business and government; while 
promising, the initiative has not yet delivered measurable efficiency gains. 
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By contrast to other parts of the world (specifically Asia), there are relatively few CDM projects 
in South Africa. From inception in 2005, 37 proposals are pending, and six small projects have 
been registered, which together will reduce CO2-equivalent emissions by 0.27 MT per year. 
Three are fuel-switching projects in industrial plants, switching from coal to natural gas or 
biomass; one plans to utilise landfill gas, and one is a small biofuels project. The last project is 
an innovative initiative in Cape Town, the Kuyasa project, which combines GHG mitigation 
with a number of sustainable development objectives by retrofitting low-income households 
with energy-efficient technology, including ceiling insulation, low-energy lightbulbs and solar 
water heaters (SSN 2004). The project has been implemented (with great success) on a very 
limited scale, since CDM funding only covers a fraction the implementation cost. The project 
has the potential to mitigate several tons of GHGs per house per year, and could be scaled up on 
a national basis if funding becomes available. Other small demonstration projects include a 
number of solar water heater installations for low-income households, and several building 
efficiency projects in local government. 
4.6 Public and private enterprise responses and actions  
Publicly and privately owned companies are undertaking several initiatives with mitigation 
outcomes. These can be divided into several categories: energy supply measures, energy 
demand measures, and innovations such as green energy trading. 
The two main actors involved in developing or deploying energy supply measures are Sasol and 
Eskom, the plants of which emit the largest portion of energy sector emissions. Eskom is 
currently conducting research on improving the GHG efficiency of coal-fired power plants, 
including exploring new coal-fired plant technology such as fluidised-bed combustion (Eskom 
2000b). The utility also runs a research programme on large-scale renewable energy generation, 
the South African Bulk Renewable Generation project (SABRE-GEN), and has medium- to 
long-term plans for a 100MW wind facility and a solar-thermal power plant in the Northern 
Cape. As mentioned above, Eskom is also developing the PMBR and has recently announced 
plans to build another conventional nuclear power plant. 
Both Sasol and Eskom are investigating carbon capture and storage potential in South Africa. In 
terms of emission sources, South Africa has significant potential for capture, in particular in the 
pure CO2 streams (90-98%) already produced at Sasol. The largest volumes of CO2 come from 
coal-fired power stations, but these are much lower in CO2 content (10-15%) and require 
separation of CO2 at significant additional cost (Engelbrecht et al. 2004). Storage poses more of 
a problem, since suitable geological formation in the area are of low permeability and porosity. 
Other options are being investigated, including exporting CO2 to neighbouring countries with 
more favourable geology, ocean storage, and the use of CO2 for coalbed methane recovery 
(Engelbrecht et al. 2004). If feasible, carbon storage could provide a transition to other energy 
resources. Sasol is also investigating various efficiency improvements to its plant, four of which 
are in the process of being registered as CDM projects. Various long-term possibilities are also 
being researched to replace some coal feedstock with natural gas or biomass. 
There are three areas in which business is promoting energy efficiency initiatives. The first is 
the voluntary Energy Efficiency Accord (outlined above). The second is Eskom’s Efficient 
Lighting Initiative (jointly funded by Eskom and the GEF), which promoted the use of energy-
efficient lightbulbs, aims to install 18 million CFLs over 20 years, and was the largest energy 
efficiency programme in South Africa to date (Bredenkamp 2000; Eskom 1999), which 
translates into an estimated GHG emissions reduction of approximately 0.3 Mt tons of CO2 over 
the period. The third is Eskom’s national Demand-Side Management Programme, modelled on 
a highly-successful programme conducted in the Western Cape to avoid blackouts caused by 
regional constraints on electricity supply in the winter of 2006. The programme, involving a 
number of measures including distribution of free geyser insulation blankets, replacement of 
incandescent bulbs with CFLs, demand shifting and load shedding, and a publicity campaign, 
achieved load reduction of around 600MW a fraction of the cost of other supply-side 
alternatives. The national programme aims to reduce peak demand by several GW. The 
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significance of the Western Cape programme was that it starkly demonstrated the speed, 
effectiveness and affordability of energy efficiency measures.  
Another promising, but limited development of the last five years in South Africa has been the 
establishment of a fledgling market in ‘Green Electricity’: A company trading ‘tradeable 
renewable energy certificates’ (TRECs) was established in 2003 (see www.greenxenergy.com/). 
TRECs could be used to meet companies’ renewable energy targets, and demonstrates a 
commitment to minimizing environmental impact and develop labour-intensive energy sources. 
Green electricity is generated with technology that minimises the impact on the environment 
and which uses primary energy sources (fuel) that are renewable. The TRECs constitute trade in 
‘green electricity’, not in carbon credits per se. 845 MWh of ‘green electricity’ were supplied to 
the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. Beyond WSSD, NERSA has 
indicated a commitment to regulating the development of a green electricity market. Several 
companies and government agencies have already listed on NERSA’s web-site (see 
www.ner.org.za/gwatts/green_watts_certificates.htm), although the abortion of the introduction 
of an electricity market probably requires a new institutional framework, since under the current 
framework Eskom is not obliged to ‘wheel’ power. 
4.7 Civil society initiatives on energy and climate change 
The involvement of civil society organisations in climate change policy processes and 
mitigation has mainly consisted of participation in national policy forums, advocacy and 
research, and implementing small-scale demonstration projects. Whereas trade unions have been 
involved in national forums (mainly to express concerns over potential job losses), 
environmental organisations have been consistently involved in national debates and in policy 
advocacy and research, and have also developed links with international networks such as the 
Climate Action Network to lobby for faster mitigation action and higher targets for renewable 
energy. Civil society representatives have also formed part of the country’s negotiating team at 
international climate meetings since 2003. 
5. Meeting climate change goals in the context of 
development  
Thus, while there is a relatively broad national consensus on the requirement to do something 
about climate change in South Africa, there has to date been relatively limited implementation. 
Below we examine some of the options for GHG mitigation, within the constraints we have 
outlined above. 
5.1 Key areas for mitigation options in South Africa 
Mitigation options in South Africa can be divided into three broad categories: energy efficiency 
(which reduces demand for energy, or uses it more efficiently for the same service); changing 
the fuel mix (moving to lower or non carbon-emitting energy sources); and structural changes to 
the economy, which lower the energy intensity of the economy as a whole by shifting economic 
activity and investment to less energy-intensive sectors, or taking other measures to reduce the 
need for energy services, such as changing urban planning practices to reduce transport 
requirements. These categories are represented in Figure 4 below. 
The categories also relate broadly to timescale and certainty of outcome.9 In most cases, energy 
efficiency strategies can be implemented in the short term and their cost implications are well 
understood. Changing the fuel mix cannot be accomplished quickly, since power stations and 
refineries have life-times of several decades. Probably the most long-term measures are changes 
in economic structure. While there is evidence that economies gradually move from primary to 
                                                     
9  The category ‘fuel mix’ has the attractiveness of simplicity, but does not easily accommodate all available 
forms of energy supply (especially renewable energy) – however here we mean it to signify any energy input 
into the economy. 
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tertiary sectors (Schäfer 2005), it is not clear to what extent this is influenced by policy. As 
indicated by Figure 1 above, it is likely that South Africa’s low long-term electricity prices have 
resulted in the energy-intensive sectors of the economy growing at the same pace as the tertiary 
sectors. However, if the SA economy did shift towards less emissions-intensive sectors , the 
implications for mitigation would be profound.  
Figure 4: Three broad areas for mitigation 
 
The problem which South Africa faces at present is that a limited set of mitigation options has 
been relatively well explored. Yet science increasingly suggests that GHG emissions need to 
peak in the next two decades and decline rapidly thereafter (Meinshausen 2005; ISSC 2005; 
Stern Review 2006). Developed countries will have to act first (UNFCCC 1992: Article 3), but 
the problem cannot be solved without mitigation in developing countries as well. The next 
round of international agreements under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol are likely to 
require some action from rapidly developing countries. We will outline options for South Africa 
according to the categories above, and discuss their potential ramifications. We have considered 
only energy sector-related measures, since these comprise the majority of current GHG 
emissions in South Africa.  
Several of the demand- and supply-side options below are based on a 2006 study by the Energy 
Research Centre at the University of Cape Town, which modelled a number of energy policy 
scenarios over a 25-year period (2000 to 2025) to explore implications for cost, GHG emissions, 
and other aspects of sustainable development. The study analysed some of the mitigation 
options identified earlier in Initial National Communication (RSA 2004). The reference case 
was broadly consistent with government plans, such as the Integrated Energy Plan (whole 
energy sector) (DME 2003) and the National Integrated Resource Plan (electricity) (NER 
2004b). Officials expansion plans continue to be based primarily on coal-fired power, with new 
diesel-drive gas turbines and pumped storage for electricity peaking. Carbon emissions for the 
reference case are 596 Mt of CO2, 70% higher than the 2001 figure (350 Mt) and 237% higher 
than the 1990 figure (252 Mt) (Winkler 2006). 
5.1.1 Energy efficiency mitigation options  
The least-cost energy efficiency option, and probably the quickest, of the scenarios analysed, 
involves a set of energy efficiency improvements in industry, which would save around 770 Mt 
of CO2 over the 25-year period, reduce emissions by 44 Mt, and save a net R18 billion (2000 
Rands). The energy efficiency programme would aim at a reduction of 12% from the reference 
case by 2014.10 Because of rising electricity prices (due to construction of new plants) during 
the period, energy efficiency investments become more attractive later in the period. 
                                                     
10  A target of 12% by 2014 was used for the scenario-modelling. These figures are very close to the government’s 
2005 National Energy Efficiency Strategy targets (12% by 2015), and those additionally specified in the 
National Energy Efficiency Accord (15% by 2015 for mining and industry), but not identical. 
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Commercial energy efficiency (also with a target of 12% by 2014) is also a significant option, 
with a net saving of around R13 billion, and a reduction in CO2 emissions in 2025 of 12 Mt of 
CO2 interventions consist primarily of improved building design and improved HVAC 
efficiency (Winkler 2006, p.161-163, 176). 
A ‘cleaner and more efficient residential energy scenario’, involving energy-efficient housing 
shells, efficiency interventions such as deployment of CFLs and geyser insulation blankets, and 
a number of fuel-switching options, including installing solar water heating, replacing other 
fuels with LPG for cooking, replacing paraffin with electricity for lighting, linked to substantial 
increases in the residential electrification rate. These combined measures would save around R1 
billion, and reduce CO2 emissions in 2025 by 4 Mt. Implementation of these scenarios would 
require ‘significant policy intervention’ (Winkler 2006). Higher energy efficiency targets have 
not been modelled, but would be achievable if energy prices rose significantly. 
Another category of energy efficiency interventions would involve improving the efficiency of 
energy transformation technologies (the efficiency of converting coal into electricity or liquid 
fuels), in particular in the synthetic fuels plants. In the latter case, small-scale interventions have 
become viable if the improvements are registered as CDM projects, indicating that there would 
be significant incentives if energy prices rose, or funding was available from another source. 
Finally, there are significant efficiency gains to be made in the transport sector in South Africa, 
through motor efficiency improvements, mode-switching (particularly road and air to rail), and 
the development of integrated urban transport networks, which are currently extremely 
underdeveloped in South Africa. These options have not been well-explored on a national level. 
Since there is a significant unmet demand for transport (especially from poor South Africans), 
the development of efficient urban and regional transport networks is also an important national 
development goal. 
5.1.2 Options to lower the carbon content of the fuel mix 
The key supply-side measures are aimed at reducing the use of coal in the energy system. Major 
options involve measures to reduce or replace coal-fired power in the electricity sector, to 
displace coal use in synfuels manufacture, and to switch from coal to lower-carbon fuels in 
industry. Several options for electricity supply (other than coal, which is the reference case) 
were modelled in the scenario exercise – imported gas, important hydroelectricity, generating 
electricity domestically from pebble bed modular nuclear reactors, and introducing more 
renewable energy technologies. A sustained move towards greater diversity requires more than 
a single policy (Winkler 2006).  
The first of these involves the increased use of imported gas (either from Mozambique, Namibia 
or in the form of LNG), primarily as fuel for combined-cycle turbines for electricity generation. 
This would cost a little more than the reference case (around R95 million), but save around 200 
Mt CO2 over the study period, with a reduction of 12 Mt in 2025. A major constraint on this 
scenario is the limited size of gas reserves available in southern Africa, although there is some 
potential to build gas-fired power plants in Namibia and export the electricity to South Africa. 
The second option considered would involve importing hydroelectricity. There are two sources 
potentially available. The first is Mozambique, from which South Africa already imports 
hydroelectricity (from the Cahora Bassa plant). However, there is the potential to construct a 
new plant downstream (at the Mepanda Uncua site) of around 1300MW. The second source is 
the Inga Falls on the Congo River in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which could 
potentially provide from 40 000 to 100 000 MW of capacity, but would require significant 
strengthening of the regional electricity grid, as well as posing fairly significant security of 
supply risks, given the political instability of the region. The option which was modelled only 
involved importing electricity from Mozambique (assuming completion of Mepanda Uncua). 
This would save R11 billion, and also save 167 Mt of CO2 emissions, as well as 17 Mt in 2025. 
If the security of supply risks could be successfully mitigated, importing hydroelectricity from 
the DRC could be one of the most important ways of changing the electricity supply profile, and 
could reduce CO2 emissions drastically without significantly reducing the energy intensity of 
the South African economy. 
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The third option involved the deployment of Eskom’s indigenous nuclear reactor concept, the 
PBMR. Assuming that the technological challenges are successfully met, the scenario assumed 
that around 4500MW of baseload nuclear capacity is added to the electricity system during the 
period, which would add R4.6 billion to the costs for the reference scenario, and would avoid 
246 Mt of CO2 including avoiding 32 Mt CO2 emissions in 2025, subject to the usual 
complications and constraints of nuclear power.  
Renewable energy options in South Africa, the fourth and fifth options, were modelled for both 
electricity-generating renewable technologies (a combination of biomass, solar thermal 
technologies and wind energy), which added R4.5 billion to the reference case, avoided 180 Mt 
of CO2 emissions, and would cut CO2 emissions in 2025 by 15 Mt, and for a biofuels scenario, 
which would provide around 8% of liquid fuels by 2025, cost R2 billion more than the reference 
case, and would save 31 Mt of CO2 over the period, and around 5 Mt in 2025. The extent of 
renewable energy deployment in these scenarios is relatively modest. The electricity target is in 
line with the state’s target of achieving 10 000 GWh of generated electricity by 2014 (see 
above), but current thinking in government is that ¾ of this target will now be met through 
biofuels. 
Other, more ambitious renewable energy interventions are possible, particularly involving a 
massive effort to develop solar energy technologies, since South Africa has excellent solar 
resources, but this depends again on the electricity price. Current evidence indicates that solar 
water heating (for domestic, commercial and potentially industrial applications) is economically 
viable, even given current low prices. Developing the potential of solar energy in South Africa 
would probably require a massive state-driven research and an investment programme similar to 
the synthetic fuels programme in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Other supply-side options which require further investigation are new coal technologies,, 
unconventional coal technologies such as fluidised-bed combustion and others, as well as 
carbon capture and storage combined with coal gasification (many of which are being 
researched by Sasol and Eskom). There are currently no reliable estimates for the cost of these 
programmes, especially given the lack of oil or gas wells in South Africa, which adds 
significant technical complications to CO2 storage. Another option would be to convert Sasol’s 
synfuels plant to a natural gas feedstock, which would reduce CO2 emissions by around 30Mt. 
However, gas reserves in Mozambique (from which gas is currently piped to Sasol’s plant) are 
currently too limited to convert more than 15% of feedstock to gas. Other efficiency 
improvement, plus the potential use of biomass as a partial feedstock, might reduce CO2 
emissions by 10-20%, but Sasol also plans (with government backing) to build another similar 
plant, which (with efficiency improvements) will increase CO2 emissions by around 40Mt per 
annum, unless the CO2 is captured and stored, which is being investigated by Sasol. There are 
also plans to develop a biofuels industry in South Africa, but on a relatively small scale, only 
replacing around 8% of conventional liquid fuels, which represents a limit based on price and 
on available arable land and water resources. 
5.1.3 Structural changes to the economy 
The modelled options outlined above, if they were all implemented, would reduce CO2 
emissions from the reference case by 143 Mt (24%), but these would still be 30% higher than 
the 2000 level. All these scenarios have been modelled with the assumption that the structure of 
the energy system (and thus the economy) remains essentially the same. Another more complex 
set of options exists for GHG mitigation which involve significant changes to the structure of 
the energy system; in particular, options which would lower the energy intensity of the 
economy. At present, industrial energy use is the main driver for the high energy intensity of the 
economy, whereas projections indicate that transport will become a major factor in the next few 
decades in terms of both its contribution to GHG emissions, and its contribution to the energy 
intensity of the economy.  
Measures aimed at lowering the energy intensity of the industrial sector, other than through 
improving efficiency of existing processes, would involve addressing the problem of the large 
proportion of energy-intensive industries in the composition of the country’s industrial sector 
(over 45% in 1991 in South Africa’s case (DME 2002a)). Most of these industries were 
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established as a result of investment decisions (often with considerable incentives from 
government) made in the last 40 years, primarily on the basis of low energy prices, which is the 
basis of South Africa’s international competitiveness in the minerals beneficiation and 
processing sector. In addition to this, the mining sector is inherently energy-intensive, especially 
deep-level gold mining. While some minerals processing operations beneficiate locally-mined 
minerals and provide local inputs (for example iron and steel, coal, ferrochrome etc), others are 
based in South Africa primarily because of the country’s low electricity prices. The best 
example of this is the aluminium processing industry, which imports all its feedstock from 
elsewhere, and exports most of the final product; aluminium smelting in South Africa is thus 
really another form of coal beneficiation or electricity export. 
While growth trends in the economy in the last two decades have resulted in higher growth in 
the advanced manufacturing and services sectors (as part of an orthodox development path), 
significant investment in energy-intensive industries in the 1990s has limited this 
diversification, and several new mega-projects (including a new aluminium smelter) are now in 
the planning stage. Furthermore, future mitigation-linked energy price rises in other 
(particularly industrialised) countries will enhance this competitive advantage, especially given 
the growing demand for commodities from the Asian economies. In addition to this, current 
minerals and industrial policies encourage foreign investment in energy-intensive minerals 
processing industries, usually under long-term price compacts, but also under industrial 
development incentives linked to spatial development initiatives such as the Coega11 project. 
However, investments in these industries do not occur incrementally, but tend to be based on 
mega-projects involving a handful of investors. Thus, decisions to invest are usually based on 
lengthy negotiations with government and Eskom, and thus tend to be directly related to 
industrial policy initiatives, and the state’s willingness, usually on a case-by-case basis, to 
facilitate the projects through its agencies, and provide the necessary incentives and 
infrastructure. Since these investments (made in plant which has a 20-40 year lifespan) are made 
on the basis of low and very stable energy prices, and since most of the output is traded in the 
international market, there is a very high sensitivity to energy price rises. 
What interventions might shift the South African economy to less emissions-intensive sectors? 
Making policy proposals in this area is very difficult due to the complexity of the question 
under consideration, but we propose that the strategies which follow might form a useful part of 
a more ambitious mitigation programme for South Africa. The aim of these strategies would be 
to protect South Africa’s competitive advantage in the short and medium terms, while aiming to 
build other competitive advantages in the long term. At the same time, the strategies would aim 
to identify parts of the economy which are not as sensitive to energy price rises, and pursue 
more aggressive mitigation options in these. 
The first strategy would be to adjust state incentives (including industrial incentive programmes 
and special dispensations on low electricity prices) to avoid attracting further energy-intensive 
investments on terms which would severely restrict future mitigation options, and shift these 
incentives to lower carbon industries. While this coincides with the broad tenor of current 
industrial policy (but not necessarily of public investment), it would require adjustments in the 
way policies are implemented, and the inclusion of GHG mitigation criteria in incentive 
programmes. 
The second strategy would involve the application of a much more rigorous mitigation 
programme to the non-energy-intensive12 section of the economy, since the international 
competitiveness of this part of the economy would not be significantly affected by higher 
energy prices, which would be ameliorated by energy efficiency improvements in the medium 
term. The costs of switching to low-carbon fuels could be allocated disproportionately to this 
section of the economy, which would also boost investments in energy efficiency. The aim of 
this strategy would be to insulate the non-energy intensive section of the economy from the 
                                                     
11 Government agencies are developing a new deep-water port in the Easter Cape province, and set out to attract 
large industrial anchor tenants. So far, they have succeeded in attracting a new aluminium smelter, which will 
add several hundred MW of electricity demand, and require strengthening of the local power grid. 
12 Energy-intensive industries could be identified by the percentage of their costs spent on energy. 
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long-term effect of low energy prices, and thus encourage a significantly higher investment in 
energy efficient technology and design. An exception would be low-income households – policy 
would have to ensure that safe and adequate energy services were delivered at an affordable 
cost, which might include state (or other agency) subsidised energy efficiency measures. 
The third strategy would be to encourage a shift to another area of competitive advantage with 
low-carbon characteristics, which makes use of local resources. One of the best prospects is a 
solar thermal energy industry, since South Africa has some of the best solar resources in the 
world. In the same way that Demark became a world leader in wind technology, South Africa 
could become a world leader in solar thermal technology, with the right supporting measures. 
These would be a combination of measures, including the creation of a local market 
(commitment by Eskom and IPPs to commission a certain number of plants), state incentives 
and support (including technology support and public investment), and risk-sharing with 
international partners, either from the private sector, or through multilateral agencies. The South 
African state has a long history of supporting and developing new energy technologies to meet 
national goals, the most recent example of which is the PBMR. A similar level of public 
funding for solar thermal technology could establish a significant programme. 
The fourth strategy would aim to reform the energy-intensive sector itself, by gradually 
reducing its energy intensity while protecting employment and existing investment. There are 
four parts to the strategy: 
• The first would reconsider the current beneficiation-promotion strategies in terms of 
energy intensity: while further beneficiation increases the value of primary minerals 
production (and thus cuts imports and boosts exports), sometimes quite dramatically, it 
also leads to further energy costs; furthermore, higher levels of beneficiation also tend 
to create opportunities for less capital-intensive employment generation. While 
beneficiation often leads to increased energy intensity, in some cases the added value of 
the beneficiated products outweighs the additional energy use, and the energy intensity 
of the economy would decrease. Thus, by targeting beneficiation policies accordingly, 
the economy could be moved to a lower energy intensity, and more employment would 
result. 
• The second would consist of higher energy efficiency targets negotiated with specific 
energy-intensive industries, to lower energy intensity faster in the short and medium 
term. 
• The third would consist of an initiative in international climate change forums to 
explore the future of energy-intensive industries, which might include a short- or 
medium-term international carbon tax, or a long-term global strategy for locating these 
industries. 
• The fourth strategy would examine the possibilities of resource companies shifting from 
an emphasis on resource extraction to materials provision, which would include a shift 
to recycling, producing biomaterials, and investigating new material-related 
technological possibilities. 
A final economy-wide strategy might include a tax on energy use: a tax equivalent to R50/ton of 
coal would mitigate 28 Mt of CO2 over a 20-year period and add a mere R23 million cost to the 
reference case (Winkler 2006). An alternative cap-and-trade system (fixed quantities) 
(Weitzman 1974) might be difficult to implement in developing countries like South Africa, 
which have large opportunity costs to spending money on climate change – notably spending it 
on development. Yet it might be possible to introduce cap-and-trade systems that mix the 
regulation of quantities of GHG emission with using economic instruments (tradeable permits) 
to meet that objective cost-effectively. One early assessment of domestic emissions trading was 
conducted for South Africa (Blignaut 2001), but has thus far not been pursued in policy circles. 
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5.2 Key constraints 
Unlike many developing countries, South Africa does not suffer from lack of technological 
capacity or inability to raise finance, as has been demonstrated by large-scale and innovative 
projects developed in the past in the energy sector. For instance, in both the development of a 
large-scale synfuels programme in the 1960s and 1970s, and the massive electrification 
programme of the 1990s, technological innovation was rapid and effective, and the programmes 
were financed in a number of innovative ways. Instead, constraints lie elsewhere. We have 
considered three types of constraints in this section: first, constraints created by low energy 
prices, which are probably the most fundamental constraints to more extensive renewable 
energy and energy efficiency programmes; second, technological capacity; and third, constraints 
arising from current structures of institutions and policy domains.  
5.2.1 Prices, markets and regulation  
As we have pointed out above, low energy prices, and particularly low electricity and coal 
prices, are a major barrier to investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency. While coal 
prices are low primarily because of the favourable geology of coal deposits, electricity prices 
are currently below marginal cost, since current capacity was effectively paid for by electricity 
consumers in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, as a parastatal for most of its existence, Eskom 
did not have to pay tax and dividends, and was the recipient of other indirect subsidies, such as 
insurance by the country’s Reserve Bank against currency depreciation in the 1980s and early 
1990s; (the estimated benefit to Eskom was R22 579 million between 1986 and 1998 (Steyn 
2000: 7)); in combination these contributed to significant allocative inefficiency (Roberts 2005). 
Even with this windfall, Eskom’s debt burden was high in the 1980s, but since the early 1990s, 
Eskom has been able to reduce its debt-equity ratio13 (due to very few demands for further 
capital expenditure) and price electricity at a very low marginal cost (Van Horen & Simmonds 
1998; Davis & Steyn 1998; Eberhard 2000). Eskom’s high debt-equity ratio in 1986 at 2.93 
declined to 0.85 in 1998 (Steyn 2000), and was reduced further by 11.5% per year to 0.63 in 
2000 (Eskom 2000a). In a commercial firm, lower debt repayments would have been replaced 
by higher payments of dividends to shareholders, but this did not happen in the case of Eskom 
until after 2001. With the capital costs of power plants having been paid off by consumers and 
others in the 1970s and 1980s, consumers are currently paying only for coal and distribution 
costs. The overall effect is that the price of electricity does not reflect true costs (the value of the 
inputs used to produce electricity): the full capital costs are not reflected, nor are externalities 
priced.14 While electricity prices will rise in the near future due to new plant construction, 
consumers will only pay the average cost of electricity production, and thus pricing below 
marginal cost will persist for a number of years, deterring investments in energy efficiency, and 
leading to a significant price gap between existing coal-fired power and alternative options, such 
as renewable energy and energy efficiency options. 
While mechanisms such as the CDM can make an important contribution by overcoming this 
price gap in certain cases, other more creative measures are required, possibly including 
multilateral financing. Positive incentives need to be put in place to promote the deployment of 
climate-friendly technology in countries like South Africa. This could take the form of 
development assistance, but larger flows are likely to be in foreign direct investment. South 
African enterprises, such as Eskom and Sasol, are capable of raising significant capital at very 
low cost (Eskom has its own treasury, and issues bonds which have a higher rating than those of 
the South African government), but might look for risk-sharing agreements to invest in 
unfamiliar technologies. This might be relevant in South Africa particularly for technologies 
proven at large scale, but not yet fully commercialised.  
                                                     
13  A debt-equity ratio of 1.00 would show equal debt and equity. In other words, only half of the liabilities of the 
company would be financed by borrowing (debt), the rest from other provisions, such as capital development 
funds, loans redeemed and other capital receipts that reflect the use of retained earnings of the company to 
support assets. A ratio greater than 1.00 shows more reliance on debt to finance operations, below 1.00 the 
operations are finances from retained earnings.  
14  South African power plants are not equipped with scrubbers to remove SOx and NOx gases. 
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Another constraint to investment in renewable energy is a lack of clear rules for market access 
by independent power producers interested in entering the renewables market (including 
industrial users interested in investing in cogeneration plants). Whereas in many other countries 
there are regulations which specify the conditions under which independent producers can sell 
power to the incumbent utility (and the price they might receive for it), or wheel it through the 
transmission grid to a third party, no such regulations or obligations exist in South Africa yet, 
thus creating significant uncertainty for potential investors. 
5.2.2 Technology support and development  
While South Africa has an impressive array of technological resources, it lacks specific 
technological capacity in many areas of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies. A 
Technology Needs Assessment for mitigation measures is currently being carried out for the 
Department of Science and Technology. It is also possible that technology transfer could be 
facilitated through a multilateral technology transfer facility. While many technologies are 
successfully transferred by private companies through the market, there are certain types of 
market failure which such a facility could help overcome.  
5.2.3 Institutions and policy frameworks  
The main constraint in this section is the problem of policy co-ordination. While the climate 
change policy process so far has been very open, involving a wide range of government 
departments and stakeholders, it has developed very slowly, and there are many problems in 
reconciling climate change policies with policies in other sectors of government. Seeing climate 
change policies as part of a broader programme in sustainable development does help to address 
this problem. Yet there is still a significant gap between development and sustainable 
development. There is a surprisingly large area of common ground between the government’s 
general development framework (AsgiSA) and the type of sustainable development measures 
which would contribute to GHG mitigation. Currently, most expertise in government on climate 
change is located in the DEAT, but it also needs to shift into the line-function department most 
affected, the DME. To effectively address development, climate policy needs to move onto the 
agendas of the economic cluster of departments. (the National Treasury, the Department of 
Trade and Industry, and the Department of Public Enterprises). As heads of state become 
involved in climate negotiations, this shift needs to continue into the President’s Office. One of 
the ways in which this constraint could be addressed would be to use international funding to 
fund the appointment of dedicated climate change policy personnel in the Presidency. Given the 
important role that the Presidency plays in co-ordinating national policy, this would be a 
stepping stone to addressing institutional and policy constraints in other areas (such as energy 
market structure) in more detail. 
5.3 Potential for international co-operation to assist with mitigation 
and removal of constraints  
There are three areas in which international co-operation would enhance the implementation of 
mitigation policies in South Africa: finance, technology and capacity-building. Since Annex II 
Parties to the UNFCCC undertook in Article 4.3 to ‘meet the agreed full incremental costs’ of a 
range of measures undertaken by developing countries (UNFCCC 1992), including activities in 
these three areas, a range of creative options could be developed to marry these obligations with 
international co-operation in these areas. The first addresses the problem of the ‘price gap’, the 
cost difference between renewable energy options and existing fossil-fuel-based power. There 
are a number of innovative financing instruments which could be applied, including the CDM, 
which would lower the risk of these investments for local investors (primarily Eskom). Other 
options would be to ‘green’ Official Development Assistance and export credit policies in 
OECD countries, as well as establishing a Multilateral Technology Acquisition Fund. 
Mobilizing funds for low-carbon technology in long-life infrastructure investments is central to 
the question of who will ‘buy down’ the costs of low-carbon technology. If it were structured to 
leverage private investment as well, funding could be channeled through a Multilateral 
Technology Acquisition Fund or similar instrument. Concessionary finance might be sufficient 
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in middle-income countries like South Africa, whereas poorer countries might require direct 
funding. 
The second involves technical co-operation. Technology is central to addressing the challenge 
of climate change. Massive new investments required in the energy sectors over the next 30 
years – both in South Africa and globally – provide a window of opportunity for technological 
change (without premature retirement of existing capital stock). A multilateral technology 
transfer facility might set out to do several things to promote the ‘development and climate 
agenda’, including addressing intellectual property rights barriers, accessing multilateral 
funding for technology development in developing countries, and developing international 
technology standards and research and development protocols. Inter-governmental agreements 
could be facilitated to enable access to commercial technologies whilst respecting property 
rights, and such a facility could act as an exchange facility for information on the development 
and deployment of viable technological solutions in developing countries, thus promoting 
South-South technology transfer. Another two areas where such a facility might be useful is 
capacity-building in state and non-state entities where technology choices are made and 
implemented, and the development of demonstration projects. Whereas South Africa has 
significant technology capacity, there is currently little incentive to investigate or implement 
certain types of mitigation projects (for instance, super-efficient buildings), and there is thus 
little technological capacity to do so. 
The third area where international co-operation could be decisive is capacity-building in, and 
support for, climate change-related policymaking, which could include training officials, 
seconding of experts to key strategic points in government, and funding specialised agencies or 
posts, as well as the facilitation of South-South exchanges on innovate policies and measures. 
6. Conclusion 
South Africa has urgent socio-economic development priorities. To undo the legacy of 
apartheid, millions of people require housing, clean water, sewage, land, energy and other basic 
services. Moving to a low-carbon economy in this context poses particular problems: the 
existing development path is energy-intensive and carbon-intensive. The use of cheap and 
abundant coal in the primary energy mix has provided relatively low-cost electricity, and little 
incentive for greater energy efficiency. Industrial development has to a significant extent been 
built around energy-intensive sectors. These sectors is very price-sensitive, and thus resistant to 
changes to a low-carbon economy. While current government policy has embraced sustainable 
development goals, the country is to a large degree locked into an energy-intensive development 
path and continues to provide significant incentives for investment in energy-intensive 
industries. These industries are still an important source of employment, investment and wealth 
for the country.  
Some start has been made in developing climate policy and integrating aspects in energy policy. 
Notably, the country has a target for renewable energy and an energy efficiency accord. Yet 
emission continue to rise. The challenge is to bend the curve of rising GHG emissions 
downwards, while making development more sustainable.  
The most effective and most affordable short-term strategy to reduce GHG emissions is an 
energy efficiency programme. Multiple studies demonstrate that significant savings can be made 
at no overall cost to the economy and often significant benefits. The next strategy would be to 
change the fuel mix, notably to reduce the three-quarter share of coal in total primary energy 
supply. In the medium term, reduced-carbon and non-carbon energy supplies, such as natural 
gas, hydroelectricity (imported from the region) and solar thermal technologies can be 
introduced into the energy system. These measures together can achieve significant reductions 
in GHG emissions in relation to business-as-usual development. They would probably help to 
slow the rate of emissions growth, but GHG emissions are likely to continue increasing in 
absolute terms. Further action will be required to reduce emissions, in the form of pursuing the 
above programmes more aggressively, possibly with the help of international funding.  
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Perhaps the most long-term challenge is a move towards a low-carbon economy. This paper has 
suggested that this enormous challenge could be addressed through five means: incentive 
programmes for energy-intensive industries; pricing energy to reflect external costs for non-
energy-intensive sectors of the economy; investment (both public and private, national and 
international) in climate-friendly technologies where the country has a resource, e.g. solar 
thermal technology; a raft of measures to lower the energy intensity of key industries, including 
selective beneficiation, accelerated energy efficiency programmes, and other options such as a 
shift from resource extract to materials provision; and finally economy-wide measures such as 
carbon taxes or emissions trading systems.  
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